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THE PATHOLOGIES OF DIGITAL CONSENT 
NEIL RICHARDS* AND WOODROW HARTZOG** 
ABSTRACT 
Consent permeates both our law and our lives—particularly in the 
digital context. Consent is the foundation of the relationships we have with 
search engines, social networks, commercial web sites, and any one of the 
dozens of other digitally mediated businesses we interact with regularly. We 
are frequently asked to consent to terms of service, privacy notices, the use 
of cookies, and so many other commercial practices. Consent is important, 
but it’s possible to have too much of a good thing. As scholars have 
documented, while consent models permeate the digital consumer 
landscape, the practical conditions of these agreements fall far short of the 
gold standard of knowing and voluntary consent. Yet as scholars, 
advocates, and consumers, we lack a common vocabulary for talking about 
the different ways in which digital consents can be flawed. 
This article offers four contributions to improve our understanding of 
consent in the digital world. First, we offer a conceptual vocabulary of “the 
pathologies of consent”—a framework for talking about different kinds of 
defects that consent models can suffer, including unwitting consent, coerced 
consent, and incapacitated consent. Second, we offer three conditions for 
when consent will be most valid in the digital context: when choice is 
infrequent, when the potential harms resulting from that choice are vivid 
and easy to imagine, and where we have the correct incentives choose 
consciously and seriously. The further we fall from these conditions, we 
argue, the more a particular consent will be pathological and thus suspect. 
Third, we argue that our theory of consent pathologies sheds light on the 
so-called “privacy paradox”—the notion that there is a gap between what 
consumers say about wanting privacy and what they actually do in practice. 
Understanding the “privacy paradox” in terms of consent pathologies 
shows how consumers are not hypocrites who say one thing but do another. 
On the contrary, the pathologies of consent reveal how consumers can be 
nudged and manipulated by powerful companies against their actual 
interests, and that this process is easier when consumer protection law falls 
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far from the gold standard. In light of these findings, we offer a fourth 
contribution—the theory of consumer trust we have suggested in prior work 
and which we further elaborate here as an alternative to an over-reliance 
on increasingly pathological models of consent. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consent permeates our law. It is one of its most powerful and most 
important building blocks. This should be no wonder. We live in a society 
that lionizes individual choice in the many social roles we play every day, 
whether as consumers, citizens, family members, voters, lovers, or 
employees. Consent reinforces fundamental cultural notions of autonomy 
and choice. It transforms the moral landscape between people and makes 
the otherwise impossible possible.1 It is essential to the exercise (and 
waiver) of fundamental constitutional rights, and it is at the essence of 
political freedom, whether we are talking broadly about a “social contract” 
or making political choices for individual candidates and referenda in the 
voting booth. 
Consider the substantial amount of legal work that consent performs. It 
is the basis of contracts, whether for goods, services, real estate, or marriage. 
The consent of the governed is the basis for the rule of law in democratic 
societies and was an important basis for the American Revolution. Consent 
can also work magic. When consent is present, trespassers can become 
dinner guests, a battery can become a welcome pat on the back, and even 
what would otherwise be a sexual assault can become an act of intimacy.2 
Consent’s power, its usefulness, and its resonance with norms of 
autonomy and choice make it an easy legal tool to reach for when we want 
to regulate behavior. Just as activities that have no harm might warrant 
lesser (or no) regulation, what consenting adults choose to do together takes 
that activity presumptively beyond the law’s regulatory power. This is true 
whether the activity happens in the open or behind the proverbial closed 
doors. Consent’s power is particularly justified in cases of what we might 
 
1. For a more developed history of consent for data practices and contemplation of its role, see 
NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019); Elizabeth Edenberg & Meg Leta 
Jones, Analyzing the Legal Roots and Moral Core of Digital Consent, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1804 
(2019); Meg Leta Jones, The Development of Consent to Computing, 2019 IEEE ANNALS OF THE 
HISTORY OF COMPUTING (forthcoming). 
2. Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1804–05 (“Valid consent can render permissible an 
otherwise impermissible action. It transforms the specific relations between the consenter and consentee 
about a clearly defined action. We can consent to sexual relations, borrowing a car, surgery, and the use 
of personal information. Without consent, the same actions can become sexual assault, theft, battery, 













call “gold standard” consent—agreements between parties who have equal 
bargaining power, significant resources, and who knowingly and voluntarily 
agree to assume contractual or other legal obligations. 
Perhaps nowhere has consent been deployed more frequently as a legal 
concept than in the context of digital goods and services. Consent is the 
foundation of the relationships we have with search engines, social 
networks, commercial web sites, and any one of the dozens of other digitally 
mediated businesses we interact with regularly. We are frequently asked to 
consent to terms of service, privacy notices, the use of tracking cookies, and 
so many other commercial practices. But it’s possible to have too much of 
a good thing. As we and other privacy law scholars have documented 
elsewhere, while consent models permeate the digital consumer landscape, 
the practical conditions of these agreements fall far short of the gold 
standard.3 Think about your own agreements with the social networks you 
use, the apps you install on your phone, or the Amazon Alexa that might sit, 
listening, in your kitchen or bedroom. Do you know what you agreed to? 
Have you read the agreements? Did you have a meaningful choice? While 
the answer to these questions is usually “no,” the dominant legal regime that 
applies in the United States is that the terms and conditions of these services 
are valid as long as there is some kind of “notice and choice” to consumers.4 
In practice, and as enforced with occasional exception by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), notice-and-choice models can be legally sufficient 
even if the notice is buried somewhere in a dense privacy policy, and the 
choice is take-it-or-leave-it—accept what a company wants to do with your 
data or not use the service at all.5  
 
3. See, e.g., NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013) [hereinafter KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS]; 
MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2012); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017) 
[hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking 
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, 
Taking Trust Seriously]; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529 
(2007); Scott Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full Disclosure 
Future, 105 NW. L. REV. 1153 (2011); Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps 
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014).  
4. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS iii (2010); Woodrow Hartzog, The 
New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y 
405 (2010) [hereinafter Hartzog, The New Price to Play]. 
5. See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, supra note 3, at 1198; Richards & 
Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3, at 444. 
 












While criticism of the over-use of consent in the consumer privacy 
context is rising, critics lack a shared vocabulary with which to discuss 
when consent is legitimate, when it is flawed, and how to talk about and 
distinguish those flaws.6 Our lack of the right words and concepts with 
which to talk about defects in consent models runs into the rhetorical, 
cultural, and legal power of consent. As a consequence, consent criticism 
can fail to gain traction in the minds of those who are undecided or who 
have taken consent’s powerful “consenting adults” rhetoric at face value. 
This results in a projection of gold standard norms onto the deficient digital 
landscape in ways that we want to suggest are pathological. In this article, 
we offer a conceptual framework for thinking about when consent is valid 
and when it has pathologies, and a conceptual vocabulary for talking about 
different kinds of pathologies that consent models can suffer. Our analysis 
is focused on the consumer privacy context, but we believe that our model 
and the vocabulary of the pathologies of consent can be useful in many of 
the other areas of the law in which consent is frequently applied. 
Let us be clear about our claim: We are not arguing for a wholesale 
rejection of consent. A legal system without consent would be so radically 
different from what we have that it would be almost unimaginable. More 
fundamentally, we believe that consent should retain its prominent place in 
our law generally. Our argument is more nuanced. Consent is undeniably 
powerful, and often very attractive. But we have relied upon it too much, 
and deployed it in ways and in contexts to do more harm than good, and in 
ways that have masked the effects of largely unchecked (and sometimes 
unconscionable) power.7 The gold standard of consent to data practices has 
been articulated throughout our law as being “knowing and voluntary.”8 
European law uses an analogous method to require consent that is “freely 
given, specific, informed," and voluntary.9 But this ideal can only exist 
 
6. See Solove, supra note 3, at 1880–81; see also Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1810–14 
(arguing in favor of locating the normative core of consent for data practices).  
7. See Solove, supra note 3, at 1894. 
8. See infra Part I. 
9. For example, the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) embodies this 
concept by defining “consent” to require “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous 
indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, 
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her.” Regulation 2016/679, art. 
4(32), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 34. Recital 32 of the GDPR explains further that “Consent should be given 
by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of 
the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written 
statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement.” Regulation 2016/679, pmbl. ¶ 32, 2016 














under certain circumstances,10 which is what we hope to illuminate in this 
essay. We argue that consent is most valid when we are asked to choose 
infrequently, when the potential harms that result from the consent are easy 
to imagine, and when we have the correct incentives to consent consciously 
and seriously. The further we fall from this gold standard, the more a 
particular consent is pathological and thus suspect.  
Beyond the conceptual framework and vocabulary, we offer a third 
contribution to our understanding in this area. We believe that the theory of 
consent pathologies offered here complicates a seductive but simplistic 
story that has been offered in tech policy circles for over a decade. This is 
the notion of the “privacy paradox”—the idea that consumer anxiety about 
privacy is undermined by the fact that consumers act in privacy-diminishing 
ways in practice. Understanding this phenomenon in terms of consent 
pathologies reveals that consumers are not hypocrites who say one thing but 
do another that reveals their true preferences. On the contrary, the 
pathologies of consent show how consumers can be nudged and 
manipulated by powerful companies against their actual interests, and this 
phenomenon is easier when the legal regime that purports to protect 
consumers falls far from the gold standard. As a fourth contribution, we 
suggest that the solution is not to double down on our increasingly 
pathological models of consent, but to look to other mechanisms that are 
more sensitive to relationships and power differentials, such as those 
designed to inspire the social trust that makes consent less necessary. 
Our argument has four parts. In Part I, “the Empire of Consent,” we 
survey the many instances of consent in our law, illustrating both the varied 
work that consent performs and the varied tests for consent that courts and 
legislatures have produced. We show how different legal regimes produce 
different formulations on a continuum of how consent should be measured 
by the law, and how much consent is necessary in particular contexts. 
Toward the more restrictive end of the continuum, models of consent 
coalesce around the standard of “knowing and voluntary,” for example in 
the relinquishment of a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial. 
Yet in the digital context, the rhetorical practice of many technology 
companies is to talk like they are offering informed consent while offering 
something far inferior legal or practical matter. 
 
10. See Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1805 (“Consent can be legally binding, as long as the 
transaction has met certain legal requirements or institutional standards defining the scope of consent. 
The legal notion of consent is built on the moral notion; however, problems arise when legally binding 
consent fails to capture the relevant morally legitimate transference of rights and obligations.”).  












The heart of our article is Part II, “the Pathologies of Consent,” in which 
we offer a conceptual framework of the ways in which consent to data 
practices might fall short of the gold standard. We begin with a note on our 
methodology, adapted from the method by which the economist Richard 
Thaler developed a series of critiques of the dominant rational actor model 
in economics, thereby significantly contributing to the development of the 
field of behavioral economics.11 We then offer three different sets of 
circumstances in which we suspect that consent may be less accurate, useful 
or legitimate. First, there is unwitting consent, which takes the “knowing” 
out of “knowing and voluntary.” This can take at least three forms, including 
not understanding the legal agreement, not understanding the technology 
being agreed to, or not understanding the practical consequences or risks of 
agreement. Second, there is coerced consent, a consent that takes the 
“voluntary” out of “knowing and voluntary,” for example in cases where a 
person is confronted with a choice between consent and the loss of an 
important asset such as their life or their job. Third, there is incapacitated 
consent, in which voluntariness is not available as a matter of law, such as 
with children and others who are categorically incapable of legally 
consenting.  
In Part III, “Ideal Consent,” we suggest a set of preconditions necessary 
for consent to achieve the ideal of being knowing and voluntary. Without 
these preconditions, we argue that consent models will not be particularly 
useful or legitimate. In fact, without these preconditions, consent models for 
data practices risk being harmful and corrosive to the very autonomy they 
seek to protect. First, the choice to be made must be infrequent (so as not to 
overload the capacity of our minds to make rational choices). Second, the 
harms which we might incur by granting consent must be vivid (i.e., they 
must be easy to imagine).12 Third, the stakes of a decision to consent must 
be significant (i.e., there is ample incentive to take each decision seriously). 
Consent works well where these three criteria are satisfied. But where some 
or all of these criteria are not present, consent starts to lose both its 
usefulness and its very legitimacy. We call the presence of these three 
factors gold standard consent, and argue that it should be the benchmark 
against which the legal and ethical validity of consent are measured. 
 
11. For Thaler’s own description of his process, see RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE 
MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2016). For an application of this process in privacy law 
scholarship, see ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2010). 
12. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME 













In Part IV, “Beyond Consent,” we offer a roadmap for a world in which 
consent is cabined to the contexts in which it is most effective and most 
legitimate. As elsewhere in the paper, we use the example of the laws 
regulating consumer technologies powered by human information as our 
example. We argue that while consent will and should remain an important 
option in the legal toolbox, we should resist the easy but troublesome 
tendency of always going to consent in the first instance. In other words, we 
argue that consent should not be a common tool in modern data protection 
regimes. To use the parlance of Silicon Valley, consent does not scale. It is 
almost entirely incompatible with the modern realities of data and 
technology in all but the most limited of circumstances.  
Instead, building on other work, we propose a privacy framework with a 
major focus on the concept of trust.13 Trust-based protections would require 
parties in information relationships to protect the data placed in their care 
and to treat each other fairly and with deference. They would prohibit 
entrusted entities from asking for consent to practices that would make 
people unreasonably vulnerable. Lawmakers looking to embrace trust and 
minimize the pathologies of consent could leverage rules concerning the 
design of technologies and legal prohibitions on consent such as 
unconscionability to shift the policy conversation in a way that values both 
consent and privacy, and protects the millions and millions of human beings 
to whom these rules apply. 
I. THE EMPIRE OF CONSENT 
Consent flows through our legal system to such an extent that it would 
be almost impossible to imagine our law without it. Consent’s importance 
in our law has been recognized for generations. Henry Sumner Maine 
famously observed in 1861 that “the movement of the progressive societies 
has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”14 Maine’s argument 
was that unlike the premodern societies characterized by social interactions 
structured by kinship and other forms of hierarchical ordering, modern 
societies were increasingly characterized by social interactions structured 
 
13. See generally Richards & Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, supra note 3; Richards & Hartzog, 
Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3; ARI WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST (2018); Jack Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016). 
14. 1 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 101 (J.H. Morgan ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1917) (1861). 
 












by contracts—private agreements whose chief hallmark was consent.15 
Consent thus became one of our basic social structures, and if we look for 
it, we can see it everywhere. 
Let us take a moment to be precise about what we mean here. When we 
talk about “consent” in this article, we mean a legal relationship 
characterized in form or substance by agreement or a concurrence of wills.16 
In a moral sense, we mean to rely on Edenberg and Jones’s definition of 
consent as “effective communication of an intentional transfer of rights and 
obligations between parties. Valid consent transforms the specific relation 
between the consenter and consentee about a clearly defined action.”17 In its 
strongest form, as Justice Story memorably put it in 1835, “[c]onsent is an 
act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a 
balance the good or evil on each side.”18 Yet as we will see below, the 
prevalence of consent in our law includes weaker forms, including 
presumed consent and even fictive consent. In this Part, we survey at a high 
level some of the ways in which Maine’s observation about contractual 
ordering has proven correct by showing how our law can be viewed in a 
very real sense as an empire of consent.  
Perhaps the easiest place to begin an appreciation of the role of consent 
in our law is the common law. As all lawyers are familiar, contract law’s 
basic elements of offer and acceptance are predicated on the notion of 
consent. Contractual consent is objective, meaning it does not matter what 
you actually thought you were consenting to, only what you objectively 
manifested consent to.19 Contract law also allows consent to alternative 
dispute resolution, via arbitration or mediation clauses, at least when such 
contracts are not adhesionary, and there is bargaining power between the 
contracting parties.20  
Property law’s hallmark is the right of alienation—the voluntary right to 
agree to transfer one’s property, real or personal—to another.21 This 
 
15. Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Henry Maine’s “Modern Law”: From Status to Contract and Back 
Again?, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 154 (2017). 
16. Cf. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A voluntary yielding to what 
another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose, esp. 
given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent.”).  
17. Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1811. 
18. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 222 (1835). 
19. Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4. 
20. E.g., Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589, 597 (La. Ct. 
App. 2000). 














principle runs throughout the law of property, but it is easiest to appreciate 
in the rules governing gifts, which require donative intent (a donor 
voluntarily intending (i.e., consenting) to give a gift to the donee), delivery 
(physical transfer of the gift to the donee), and acceptance (consent to the 
gift by the donee).22 Similarly, consent allows exceptions to the right to 
exclude, whether by turning a trespasser into a dinner guest, or by allowing 
the creation of licenses, easements, and bailments.  
Consent is less central in tort law, which imposes duties that flow to the 
general population or some subset thereof, like in the case of the duty to 
exercise reasonable care. But consent remains important, for it can work to 
assume the risks of someone else’s actions. Thus, if you are my karate 
instructor, and you negligently (or even recklessly) injure me, I might be 
unable to recover if I sue you because I assumed the risk of engaging in the 
dangerous sport and consented to spar with you in the first place.23 Or if you 
go to watch the Boston Red Sox and are injured by a foul ball, the Red Sox 
will probably be immune from suit because you are presumed to have 
accepted the risk of injury by consenting to watch them play at Fenway Park 
(or wherever).24  
With respect to intentional torts like assault, battery, conversion, and 
trespass, consent is typically treated as an affirmative defense.25 Consider a 
surgical procedure, which would be a legal battery without consent, and 
even where some consent is supplied can become a battery again when 
consent is exceeded.26 Consider further the important role consent plays in 
the complex of “privacy torts,” the subset of intentional torts dealing with 
the collection, dissemination, and use of sensitive personal information. The 
four torts recognized by William Prosser27—intrusion into seclusion, 
disclosure of private facts, false light publicity, and appropriation of 
likeness—are all negated by consent to the invasion of privacy.28 Thus, for 
example, it violates the intrusion tort when a surgeon photographs a patient 
during cosmetic breast surgery, and the patient’s consent form does not 
 
22. Guardian State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Jacobson, 369 N.W.2d 80, 83–84 (Neb. 1985).  
23. E.g., Levine v. Gross, 704 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
24. Costa v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
25. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16.  
26. E.g., Kaplan v. Mamelak, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
27. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). For additional background 
about the privacy torts and Prosser’s role in their creation, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN 
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 176–179 (expanded ed. 2003); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. 
Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010). 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977). 
 












cover such uses of the photographs.29 Consent to have your image used for 
commercial purposes is also a defense to an action for appropriation of 
likeness for commercial gain.30 Of course, there are more intentional torts 
governing the collection, use, and disclosure of information than the four 
recognized by Prosser. A full “expanded set” of privacy torts includes 
trespass, breach of confidence, defamation, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.31 Yet even this broader group of torts can be negated by 
defense—a trespasser with permission becomes a licensee or even a guest,32 
permission to disclose eliminates a duty of confidentiality,33 and you can 
permit (or pay) someone to say mean or false things about you. In all of 
these cases, if you consent, you cannot sue. 
Beyond contracts, property, and tort, consent also plays an important role 
in the law regulating family and sexual relations. For over a century, courts 
have recognized that “[t]he fundamental principle of all marriage is mutual 
consent.”34 This principle was echoed in Obergefell v. Hodges, when the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of 
marital choice, a concept that runs throughout its analysis.35 The foundation 
of the Court’s analysis is thus its statement that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s liberty guarantee “extend[s] to certain personal choices 
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs.”36 The Court concluded that “[u]nder 
the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal 
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and 
diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”37 Consent runs broadly 
throughout the rest of family law as well; it can be the difference between a 
loving sexual act and sexual assault or rape. The age at which it becomes 
legal to engage in sexual activity is of course known as the “age of 
 
29. Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, 330 P.3d 126 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).  
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
31. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR THE DIGITAL 
AGE 158 (2015). 
32. E.g., State v. Pixley, 200 A.3d 174, 177 (Vt. 2018) (explaining that trespass requires a person 
to enter the land without legal authority or consent). 
33. E.g., Grimminger v. Maitra, 887 A.2d 276, 279 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 2005) (patient consent serves 
as an affirmative defense to a claim of a breach of physician-patient confidentiality). 
34. Recent Cases: Marriage — Validity — Common-Law Marriage — Mistake as to Existence 
of Prior Marriage Between the Parties, 34 HARV. L. REV. 561, 561 (1921) (summarizing the holding of 
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918)). 
35. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). 
36. Id. at 2597. 














consent.”38 Consent is also the key feature in the legality of some sexual 
activities in BDSM39 and is also an issue when elderly married couples 
engage in sexual activity when one partner has lost the capacity to legally 
consent.40 
Beyond the common law, consent also plays a critical role in the context 
of digital privacy regulation. In the United States, the dominant regime of 
privacy regulation is known as “notice and choice.” As interpreted by the 
Federal Trade Commission under its Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
authority, this has meant that consumers are presumed to have consented to 
data practices as long as there has been some kind of “notice” to the 
consumer about what is happening and some kind of “choice” about 
whether they want it to happen. A recent FTC report on company 
surveillance of consumers across digital devices (for example tracking 
laptop web browsing activity to deliver targeted ads to the same consumer 
on a cell phone) is illustrative of the FTC’s approach:  
As with traditional forms of tracking, companies should offer 
consumers choices about how their cross-device activity is tracked. 
And, when companies offer such choices, the FTC Act requires that 
the companies respect them. To the extent opt-out tools are provided, 
any material limitations on how they apply or are implemented with 
respect to cross-device tracking must be clearly and conspicuously 
disclosed.41 
In practice, however, such requirements are relatively easy to comply with, 
as all a company needs to do to avoid FTC liability for unfair or deceptive 
trade practices if challenged is show that their use of consent is neither 
deceptive nor unfair.42 Thus “notice” can mean a vague but not false 
description of data practices buried deep within a long privacy policy and 
“choice” can mean no more than the choice to use the service in the first 
place (Apple, Android, or no phone at all, for example).43 It is perhaps for 
 
38. E.g., State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Minn. 2018) (“What has been known as 
statutory rape—sexual conduct with a person not of the age of consent—has been a crime in Minnesota 
since it was first organized as a territory.”). 
39. See William Eskridge, The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47, 49–
50 (1995); Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 117 (2014). 
40. Alexander Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016). 
41. FED. TRADE COMM'N, CROSS-DEVICE TRACKING: AN FTC REPORT 13 (Jan. 2017). 
42. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of “unfair” or “deceptive” trade practices in or 
affecting interstate commerce). 
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this reason that when Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before 
Congress in response to a series of privacy scandals involving his company, 
his defense, first and foremost, was that Facebook puts its users in 
“control,”44 a good sound bite, but one that can be all but meaningless as a 
legal requirement. 
Consent within Europe’s data protection frameworks is more rigorous 
than in parts of US privacy law. Indeed, unlike US law, the European Union 
(EU) treats privacy and the related but distinct concept of data protection as 
fundamental rights. Consent remains central to this fundamental rights-
based approach, although Europe’s modern data protection regime is 
skeptical of over-relying on the notion.45 Recital Seven of the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR explicitly states that “Natural persons 
should have control of their own personal data.”46 This control is effectuated 
significantly through the mechanism of “informed consent” as a basis for 
legitimizing data processing.47 Beyond the GDPR, the reasoning behind the 
 
44. Written Testimony from Facebook to House Energy and Commerce Committee for Record 
of April 11, 2018 Hearing (June 29, 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/ 
HHRG-115-IF00-Wstate-ZuckerbergM-20180411.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7LR-L7XU] (note: the word 
‘control’ is mentioned over 1,000 times). It goes on like this for a while. See also Dan Fletcher, How 
Facebook is Redefining Privacy, TIME (May 20, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0, 
9171,1990798-4,00.html [https://perma.cc/D66L-4FG3] (“‘The way that people think about privacy is 
changing a bit . . . . What people want isn't complete privacy. It isn't that they want secrecy. It's that they 
want control over what they share and what they don't.’”); Anita Balakrishnan, Matt Hunter & Sara 
Salinas, Mark Zuckerberg Has Been Talking About Privacy for 15 Years—Here’s Almost Everything 
He’s Said, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerbergs-
statements-on-privacy-2003-2018.html [https://perma.cc/Q4QM-JGFA] ("‘When I built the first version 
of Facebook, almost nobody I knew wanted a public page on the internet. That seemed scary. But as 
long as they could make their page private, they felt safe sharing with their friends online. Control was 
key.’”); Emily Stewart, The Privacy Question Mark Zuckerberg Kept Dodging, VOX (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/11/17225518/mark-zuckerberg-testimony-facebook-
privacy-settings-sharing [https://perma.cc/DQ84-Q2GD] (“‘Every time that a person chooses to share 
something on Facebook, they’re proactively going to the service and choosing that they want to share a 
photo, write a message to someone, and every time, there is a control right there, not buried in settings 
somewhere but right there when they’re posting, about who they’re sharing with.’”). 
45. See Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & 
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is 
And What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 68 (2019) (“[T]he GDPR is constitutionally 
skeptical of U.S. lawyers’ favorite tool: consent, particularly of the low-quality or ‘take it or leave it’ 
variety. The GDPR’s architects realized that if low-voluntariness consent could justify data activities, 
the GDPR would just become another exercise in clicking ‘I agree’ to unread, unnegotiable terms. The 
GDPR requires high-quality consent, on par with important life decisions, such as consent to medical 
treatment. In many contexts, the burdens the GDPR places on consent make consent impossible as 
mechanism to make data uses legal. Moreover, many rules in the GDPR are not waivable and continue 
to apply after somebody has consented to data use.”). 
46. Regulation 2016/679, pmbl. ¶ 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2. 














EU ePrivacy Directive is that it “enhances end-user’s control by clarifying 
that consent can be expressed through appropriate technical settings.”48 But 
as we will discuss in the Parts that follow, hard-coding consent through legal 
or technical code is fraught at best. It also probably makes things worse 
because it offers an illusion of control that dulls impetus for meaningful 
change while entrenching the pathologies of the concept into the very design 
of information technologies.49 
American constitutional law does not recognize a broad constitutional 
right to privacy the way the EU does. But when constitutional rights are at 
issue in privacy or elsewhere, U.S. law (like the EU) puts consent at the core 
of rights jurisprudence. Indeed, consent is at the very core of American 
constitutionalism. Consider these familiar founding words from the 
beginning of the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.”50  
Consent’s importance runs throughout constitutional law, particularly 
with respect to the doctrine of waiver. Constitutional rights can be waived, 
and waiver is essentially the consent to give up that right. When it comes to 
waiver, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that consent to waiver 
must be clearly and freely given. Sometimes this is textual, such as where 
the Third Amendment expressly includes consent as a defense to the 
quartering of soldiers in private homes: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace 
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of 
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”51 More significantly, 
numerous constitutional rights can only be waived where there is a showing 
that such waivers are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This is the case, 
 
48. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the 
Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Communications and 
Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, at 3.4, COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017). 
49. See, e.g., HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43; Lee Bygrave, Data Protection 
by Design and by Default: Deciphering the EU's Legislative Requirements, 4 OSLO L. REV. 105 (2017); 
Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROTECT. L. REV. 423 (2018), 
https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/edpl/2018/4/5/display/html [https://perma.cc/T4LA-HNE8] [hereinafter 
Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control]. 
50. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 












for example, for both the right to counsel52 and the right to trial by jury.53 
Many constitutional rights can also be contracted around. For example, the 
First Amendment permits non-disclosure agreements—contracts not to 
speak—such as where journalists agree with confidential sources not to 
disclose their names in exchange for a story.54 The Supreme Court has held 
that such contracts are enforceable against the press consistent with the First 
Amendment even where the identity of the source is itself newsworthy.55 
Consent is also a critical element of health law. Reflecting the 
importance of the human interests involved, rules for consent in the health 
context are strict in ways resembling constitutional law, often requiring a 
heightened form of consent known as “informed consent.” One of the 
foundations of modern biomedical ethics is the Belmont Report, a product 
of the National Research Act of 1974, which established a commission to 
study the basic ethical principles that should undergird biomedical and 
behavioral research involving human subjects.56 The Belmont report 
announced three “Basic Ethical Principles” of “respect for persons,” 
“beneficence,” and “justice,” and it offered three “applications” of these 
principles, the first of which was “informed consent.”57 The Belmont 
Report’s definition of informed consent states “[r]espect for persons 
requires that subjects, to the degree that they are capable, be given the 
opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them.”58 In practice, 
the Report urged that subjects be given the relevant information on which 
to make their decision, that researchers ensure that test subjects have 
comprehension of the information surrounding their decision, and that 
decisions be made in accordance with the idea of voluntariness. 
The Belmont Report has been tremendously influential in the field of 
biomedical ethics, and today its recommendations are reflected in the 
Common Rule, the ethical rule that governs U.S. government funded 
biomedical and behavioral research. The Common Rule prescribes detailed 
 
52. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994). 
53. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942). 
54. Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991). 
55. Id. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil 
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650 (2009). 
56. The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979). 
57. Id. at 23,193. 














substantive and documentary requirements for “informed consent.”59 There 
are extensive professional and academic literatures on informed consent in 
a variety of medical contexts reflecting substantial work and reflection. One 
classic treatise, for example, identifies five critical elements for truly 
informed consent—disclosure; comprehension or understanding; 
voluntariness; decision-making capacity or competence; and 
authorization.60  
The “knowing and voluntary” waiver standard from constitutional law 
and the informed consent standard from biomedical ethics each represent a 
kind of what we might think of as a “gold standard” consent. One could add 
another such example from the commercial context—freely negotiated 
agreements between sophisticated parties who have equal bargaining 
power, significant resources, and who knowingly and voluntary agree to 
assume contractual or other legal obligations. These are the models from 
which consent derives its strength—decisions to engage in activity based 
upon full information and free, voluntary, and informed choice. They are 
consent in its strongest and most legitimate form. 
Let’s take a step back at this point and look at the forest rather than the 
trees. Our review of consent models in the law can be distilled into three 
important principles. First, consent requirements are prevalent in many—if 
not most—areas of American law, running throughout common law, 
constitutional law, and regulatory law. Second, consent models vary in how 
strictly they protect consenting individuals, from the stringent consent 
requirements in constitutional law and health and human subjects research 
all the way down to the opt-out consents in commercial transactions that are 
so common in the digital environment. Third, despite this variance, there 
does exist a “gold standard” of consent, which is stringent and highly 
protective of individuals, whether we call it “informed consent,” “knowing 
and voluntary” agreement or waiver, or something else entirely. We would 
suggest that in spite of consent’s variance in practice, it is this gold standard 
of consent that policymakers, advocates, and others refer to when they talk 
about consent. Indeed, even Facebook’s public statements about “control” 
in the abstract evoke a much stronger notion of consent than the watered-
down legal requirements under which the company operates in practice (at 
least in the United States). When companies like Facebook negotiate 
 
59. See Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116 (general requirements for informed consent), 46.117 
(documentation requirements for informed consent). 
60. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 
274 (1986); see also Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 JURIMETRICS 253, 
259–60 (2008). 












acquisitions or commercial deals with other companies, they typically enjoy 
(for themselves) gold standard consent informed by the finest lawyers 
money can buy. Yet when their individual human customers agree to use 
their services, it is fair to say that the level of information and power 
available to those individual humans is some distance away from the gold 
standard. It is to this gap between the gold standard of consent companies 
enjoy and the weaker kinds of consent many consumers “enjoy” in the 
digital environment that we will now turn.  
II. THREE PATHOLOGIES OF CONSENT 
When he was a young academic, the American economist Richard Thaler 
kept a list of ways in which people consistently acted irrationally. Thaler’s 
list was not merely a lark by a bored iconoclastic graduate student. His list 
documented a series of human behaviors that the dominant theory of 
economics, the rational actor theory, failed to adequately explain. Again and 
again, Thaler kept encountering observable patterns of human behavior that 
were squarely at odds with the foundational assumption of economics that 
human beings act rationally to maximize their utility.  
Thaler’s list became a research agenda, as he and others began 
experimental studies of the behaviors he had observed. This community of 
scholars kept working, and these critiques of the dominant rational actor 
model helped to create the field of behavioral economics.61 This field 
proceeds from the evidence that human beings do not always behave as the 
rational actor model assumes that they would—Thaler refers to these 
fictional humans as “econs.” Instead, the field assumes that people behave 
in an observable and empirically-demonstrable way like “humans”: 
sometimes acting rationally, sometimes less than fully rationally, and 
sometimes irrationally. Behavioral economists, building on the work of 
Thaler and his mentors Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, attribute 
these behaviors to cognitive structures—and limitations—in the human 
brain.62 They argue that humans, in the words of another leading scholar in 
the field, are not merely irrational, but predictably so.63 Kahneman offers 
helpful metaphor for understanding how the human mind works. Most of 
the time, we operate using “System One,” an automatic system of cognition 
that relies upon heuristics and assumptions to help us navigate the world. 
 
61. See generally THALER, supra note 11. 
62. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 














Other times, when we encounter something new or really want to think 
something through, we use what Kahneman calls “System Two.” System 
Two is more analytical and rational, but it is also lazy and relies as much as 
it can on System One because “thinking slow” is taxing on our energies and 
on the sugar reserves in our brain. System One allows us to drive to work 
while what we think of as our mind (“System Two”) is occupied by the 
news. System One allows us to carefully read a law review article, even 
though we might derive more pleasure when we breeze through a novel (or 
a Netflix stream) using System Two.64 
In this Part, we adapt Thaler’s list methodology to privacy law—
specifically to three scenarios we have observed in which consumers in the 
digital environment “consent” to data practices in ways that seem irrational. 
We offer these cases as “Pathologies of Consent” and conclude that 
sometimes the behavior can be explained by defects in the law, especially 
where the law requires less than “gold standard” consent, whereas other 
times the behavior may be explained by particular features of human 
cognition. Nevertheless, like Thaler’s list, our suggestions are theoretical. 
To the extent we make empirical claims, such claims are primarily anecdotal 
rather than (at present) proven by experimental social science. In this 
respect, we follow a similar privacy law methodology to the one used by 
Anita Allen in her classic work Unpopular Privacy.65 
Thaler’s list complicated a relatively simplistic story that the rational 
actor model told about human behavior. We believe that our list of consent 
pathologies complicates a more specific (but equally simplistic) rational 
actor story that has circulated in privacy circles for a number of years as the 
“privacy paradox.” The “privacy paradox” is the assertion that although 
people might express a concern for privacy in the abstract, their actual 
behavior suggests that they do not actually care about their privacy in 
practice. Observers coming from a rational actor perspective suggest that 
the actions of consumers (what an economist would call their revealed 
preferences) indicate that consumers do not really care about privacy at all, 
and that concerns about privacy in the consumer context are overblown.66 
To return to Mark Zuckerberg’s testimony before Congress, if Facebook 
puts consumers in control of their privacy, but consumers continue to 
consent to privacy-revealing practices and act in privacy-destructive ways, 
they have no one to blame but themselves. Buyers beware.  
 
64. KAHNEMAN, supra note 62, at 20–24. 
65. See ALLEN, supra note 11. 
66. E.g., Patricia A. Norberg et al., The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure 
Intentions versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100 (2007). 












We believe that the three pathologies we offer in this Part complicate this 
simplistic and self-serving story, and we explain why consumers might 
understandably care about their privacy and agree to data practices that 
undermine their privacy and expose them to the risks of informational 
harms. (We also note that scholars working in the Thaler tradition have 
already begun the process of experimental testing of the ways in which 
consumers understand privacy in practice, with initial findings that confirm 
the intuitive and theoretical model we offer here.)67 
There are certainly more than three ways in which consent in practice 
can deviate from gold standard consent, but for present purposes the three 
we offer here will suffice. They are unwitting consent, coerced consent, and 
incapacitated consent. 
A. Unwitting Consent 
Let’s say that you are signing up for a new account with a tech company 
whose app or web site will let you do something. Perhaps you are signing 
up for a loyalty club at your local coffee or bagel shop, perhaps you are 
signing up for a new taxi app, dating app, or social network, or perhaps your 
iPhone or Android needs a security update that you fear will lead to a data 
breach if you don’t agree. Like most consumers, you’re in a hurry. (In the 
bagel example, maybe the people queuing behind you want to buy their 
bagels,68 or maybe you are just hungry and want to finish the transaction so 
you can eat.) In any event, most consumer transactions these days have an 
informational component—the social network you join, the bagel app you 
download, the web sites you read, or the car you buy. The problem is, most 
consumers don’t know what data practices are possible, what they have 
agreed to, or what the informational risks of the transaction are. 
This is the problem of unwitting consent. In the complex technological 
and legal landscape in which the contemporary digital consumer finds 
herself, understanding what is going on can be challenging. Yet people are 
harried, busy, and distracted, so they understandably click the “I agree” 
button and move on with their day, hoping that all will be well. This is 
 
67. For excellent reviews of the theoretical and empirical research in this field, see Alessandro 
Acquisti, Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 442 
(2016); Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human Behavior 
in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 (2015). 
68. In full disclosure, this is exactly what happened to one of the authors of this article recently, 
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unwitting consent. Unwitting consent takes the “knowing” out of “knowing 
and voluntary.” Simply put, far too often, far too many people in the digital 
environment have little to no idea about what data practices or exposure that 
they are consenting to. Compounding this problem (and enabling business 
practices that create and prey upon unwitting consent) is the conclusion 
reached by several courts that privacy policies, standing alone, are simply 
not enforceable as contracts.69 At the same time, privacy policies that are 
incorporated into the terms of use that people consent to by clicking “I 
agree” are generally recognized as part of a binding contractual agreement.70  
In fact, one of the reasons consent is such a poor fit for data practices is 
that boilerplate contract law is largely agnostic to whether people actually 
know what they are agreeing to. This is known as the objective theory of 
contracts. Under this theory, the intent of the parties, for example, ‘I thought 
I was agreeing to “X,” is irrelevant. Instead, the contract is formed based on 
what a reasonable person would have been led to believe in the relevant 
context (an objective standard).71 Although this doctrine is criticized by 
many as it applies to boilerplate contracts,72 generally parties need not have 
a “meeting of the minds” in the classic contractual sense. Rather, a 
“reasonable communication” of the terms will suffice.73 In data processing 
contexts with lengthy terms of use agreements, this dynamic puts all of the 
risk on the user, because consent can be effective even if you have no idea 
what you just agreed to. Once again, buyer beware. 
Unwitting consent can take several forms. First, consumers can fail to 
understand the legal agreement governing the information relationship they 
now have with the company. This can happen when the legal agreement is 
 
69. In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459, at *16–18 (D. Minn. 2004); 
In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
70. Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4, at 408; Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design As 
Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1635 (2011) (“When courts seek to determine a website user's privacy 
expectations and the website's promises to that user, they almost invariably look to the terms of use 
agreement or to the privacy policy.”). 
71. Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4, at 416; see also Wickberg v. Lyft, No. 18-
12094-RGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213281 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2018)  
72. See KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 3; RADIN, supra note 3; Hartzog, The New Price to 
Play, supra note 4.  
73. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004); Molnar v. 1-800-
Flowers.com, No. 08-cv-0542, 2008 WL 4772125, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (stating that “courts 
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terms of use contained therein”); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Boardfirst, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-0891, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 
974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that “the browser wrap license agreement may be arguably valid and 
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too long (such as Apple’s notoriously lengthy Terms of Services 
Agreement),74 the legal agreement uses confusing language, structure, and 
syntax (such as when consent forms deploy double and triple negatives or 
switch from “opt out” to “opt in” options in a series of choices),75 the legal 
agreement is too technical for ordinary readers to understand (many privacy 
policies reference technologies like pixel tags and MAC addresses, which 
are likely foreign concepts to the average user),76 or the legal agreement is 
too vague to specify exactly what is being agreed to (consider Amazon’s 
notoriously vague “Privacy Notice” which features terms like “we share 
your information with third parties, to permit them to send you marketing 
communications.”). 77 
A second dimension of unwitting consent is where consumers do not 
understand the technology that mediates their relationship with the 
company. For example, most people don’t realize that telecommunications 
 
74. Apple’s iOS Terms of Service (TOS) is notoriously long. Its current version, for iOS12, is 
6,901 words long. iOS Software Agreement, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iOS12.pdf 
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Sikoroyak turned the related Apple iTunes TOS agreement into a 96-page comic book starring Steve 
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Family Circus. See Bonnie Burton, Steve Jobs, Superhero: Graphic Novel Meets iTunes Service Terms, 
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systems are remarkably insecure.78 We give consent to these companies 
upon the assumption that their systems will protect us, but we are often 
mistaken about how those systems are configured. A prominent recent 
example is the scandal over Facebook’s user interface that allowed for the 
exfiltration of massive amounts of data to Cambridge Analytica, the data 
firm accused of, among other things, dubious data practices with respect to 
electoral politics.79  
Technically, Facebook users “consented” to the collection and sharing 
of this data via their privacy settings.80 Facebook went to great lengths to 
emphasize this fact, stating “Aleksandr Kogan requested and gained access 
to information from users who chose to sign up to his app, and everyone 
involved gave their consent. People knowingly provided their 
information.”81 But a closer look reveals that this consent was basically 
manufactured through obfuscation, abstraction, and sleight of hand via a 
user interface. Users likely had little idea what they were agreeing to, in no 
small part because the way the technology actually worked was opaque to 
users.  
Professor Ian Bogost, who also had an application using the same 
interface as that at issue in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, wrote of 
Facebook’s system:  
App authorizations are not exceptionally clear. For one thing, the user 
must accept the app’s request to share data with it as soon as they 
open it for the first time, even before knowing what the app does or 
why. For another, the authorization is presented by Facebook, not by 
the third party, making it seem official, safe, and even endorsed.82 
 
78.  Sarah Jamie Lewis (@SarahJamieLewis), TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2019, 10:34 PM), https://twitter. 
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Bogost was critical of Facebook’s flimsy consent structure, explaining 
that “[t]he part of the Facebook website where apps appear, under the blue 
top navigation (as seen above), introduces further confusion. To the average 
web user, especially a decade ago, it looked like the game or app was just a 
part of Facebook itself.”83 Bogost noted the seamless nature of the website 
that lacked a clear boundary between Facebook’s navigation and the third-
party app. He explained that “[i]f you look at the browser address bar while 
using a Facebook app on the website, the URL begins with 
“apps.facebook.com,” further cementing the impression that the user was 
safely ensconced in the comforting, blue cradle of Facebook’s care.84 
Of course, that impression bore little relationship to reality. When people 
opened a third-party app, Facebook’s servers passed along a request to the 
server where the app developer hosts their services. Then, the app sent all 
of its responses back to Facebook, which formatted the responses as if they 
were coming from Facebook rather than the third party.85 Through this 
setup, the third-party app was able to access significant amounts of personal 
and potentially sensitive information.86 
As the previous description suggests, consumer are unlikely to 
understand the complexities of layered applications and their correlated, 
opaque, data flows. We certainly are no experts. Lacking such knowledge, 
the “consent” requested by Facebook in this manner seems farcical. Bogost 
accused Facebook of “presenting apps as quasi-endorsed extensions of its 
core service to users who couldn’t have been expected to know better.”87 
The reason people felt so violated by Facebook could be that “they might 
never have realized that they were even using foreign, non-Facebook 
applications in the first place, let alone ones that were siphoning off and 
selling their data. The website always just looked like Facebook.”88 
Another prominent example of unwitting consent involves third party 
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known in the industry. Ad tech involves technologies like ad networks, 
which serve “as a broker between a group of publishers and a group of 
advertisers,”89 and ad servers, which are “used by ad networks, publishers, 
advertisers, and ad agencies to manage, run, and report on their advertising 
campaigns.”90 These networks and technologies are remarkably complex, 
with auctions conducted in milliseconds and involve a bevy of different 
companies processing your data to serve ads personalized on the basis of 
that data.91 Even advocates of consent regimes realize how daunting this 
problem is, conjuring up euphemisms like “consent strings” for ad tech to 
simplify and streamline compliance.92  
In January 2017, the FTC released a staff report on the problem of cross-
device tracking, the practice discussed above in which “platforms, 
publishers, and ad tech companies try to connect a consumer’s activity 
across her smartphones, tablets, desktop computers, and other connected 
devices. The goal of cross-device tracking is to enable companies to link a 
consumer’s behavior across her devices.”93 The FTC’s proposed solutions 
to this problem, however, were underwhelming. It recommended merely 
that “companies engaged in cross-device tracking: (1) be transparent about 
their data collection and use practices; (2) provide choice mechanisms that 
give consumers control over their data; (3) provide heightened protections 
for sensitive information, including health, financial, and children’s 
information; and (4) maintain reasonable security of collected data.”94 
Consistent with much of American privacy law, this amounted to notice, 
choice, heightened notice and choice for a few sensitive areas, and data 
security. 
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But given the complexity of ad tech, this puts companies in a nearly 
impossible situation: either they must simplify enough to keep the 
information digestible or be detailed enough to fully explain data collection 
and use practices, which requires some explanation of how the technology 
actually works. This approach will let everyone down, and consumers will 
be lost either way. As one of us has explained:  
The modern data ecosystem is mind-bogglingly complex, with many 
different kinds of information collected in many different ways, 
stored in many different places, processed for many different 
functions, and shared with many other parties. All that nuance gets 
glossed over when companies try to simplify and shorten 
information, the risk hidden or made to seem more benign through 
abstraction.95  
But if companies are too specific, people will suffer from decision fatigue 
and depleted limited resources to actually reach or process the tomes of 
information thrown at them. Unwitting consent lies in every direction.  
A third version of unwitting consent is that consumers might not 
understand the consequences or risks of the informational relationship. As 
a general rule, people have difficulty assessing future risks created by 
present decisions.96 We’re far too optimistic; we rely too much on the past 
and lived experience over reliable, generalizable data; we discount future 
costs too much; and we think the way things are now will stay that way.97  
But this is what we are asked to do every time a company asks for consent 
to collect and process our data. Even on good days where people are feeling 
sharp and contemplative, they are asked to construct scenarios where the 
granting of consent might come back to bite them or somehow be used in 
an adverse way against them. But unlike playing football or having surgery, 
where at least people can get a ballpark sense of risk through guestimation, 
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there’s an entire universe of consequences that most people don’t even think 
about when asked for consent to data practices.  
Privacy—the rules governing human information—is valuable because 
it helps protect against a wide array of harms. Privacy protects against so 
many harms, in fact, that it can be easy to overlook them. Some harms occur 
far downstream from the points of salience for people, like the point of 
collection, initial disclosure, or data breach. Consider consent to things like 
biometrics, particularly facial recognition technology.98 These surveillance 
technologies intuitively implicate the dangers of surveillance: the chilling 
effect of being watched and a generalized fear of retaliation or adverse 
consequences that might follow.99 But many of the harms of facial 
recognition might not immediately spring to mind when people ask for 
consent to use this technology. People’s faceprints can make harassment 
and stalking easier.100 They can gradually shift communally supported due 
process values like “presumed innocent” to “people who have yet to be 
found guilty of a crime.”101 They can facilitate the suffocation that follows 
when rules are perfectly enforced.102 They can reduce the cost of sorting, 
categorizing, discriminating, and denying opportunities, benefits, or needed 
support and treatment in furtherance of surveillance capitalism.103  
Data analytics and advertising surveillance can also involve this kind of 
unwitting consent. For example, consider how many times people are asked 
to click “I agree” to certain advertising technologies. There are credible 
allegations that the process used to target advertisements to internet users 
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based upon surveillance of their reading habits allows inferences (and 
targeting) based upon sensitive characteristics, such as race, sexual 
orientation, health, pregnancy status, and other factors.104 The possibly 
apocryphal big data anecdote that is now infamous in tech circles involves 
a story in the New York Times Magazine describing how retail giant Target 
was able to use a young woman’s purchase history and other seemingly 
benign pieces of information to accurately guess that she was pregnant (and 
subsequently send her targeted advertisements) before the teenager’s father 
found out.105 In any event, predictive analytics are no doubt outstripping 
most peoples’ notions of what is capable with data.106 Asking people to 
consent to risks that seem like science fiction is another example of 
consent’s sickness. But the bottom line remains that much if not most 
consent in the digital context suffers from the pathology of unwitting 
consent. 
B. Coerced Consent 
Sometimes a choice is not really a choice; it can be an unpleasant game 
of “would you rather” with a choice between a bad option and a terrible one. 
This is the problem of coerced consent, a choice that takes the “voluntary” 
out of “knowing and voluntary.” Coerced consent can occur, for example, 
where a person is confronted with a choice between consent and the loss of 
an important asset such as their life or their job. “Coercion” is of course a 
provocative term. We use it intentionally here to describe a number of cases 
on the continuum from fully “voluntary” consent to truly involuntary “sign 
or die” consent. The closer we get to “sign or die,” the more coercive a 
consent will be. While this category might include traditional forms of 
coercion that would invalidate agreements under the doctrine of duress, 
mediated environments that manufacture consent can also be coercive in 
more manipulative and subtle ways.  
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Like the case of unwitting consent, coerced consent uses the language of 
gold standard consent to obscure unpleasant consequences. For example, in 
2017 the U.S. Congress eliminated Obama Administration privacy 
protections limiting what cable providers like Verizon and Comcast could 
do with consumer internet browsing history. At a town meeting with 
constituents, Congressman James Sensenbrenner declared that when it 
comes to ISP privacy:  
Nobody's got to use the Internet. . . . Internet companies have invested 
an awful lot of money in having almost universal service now. The 
fact is that, you know, I don't think it's my job to tell you that you 
cannot get advertising for your information being sold. My job, I 
think, is to tell you that you have the opportunity to do it, and then 
you take it upon yourself to make that choice. . . . [sic] That’s what 
the law has been, and I think we ought to have more choices rather 
than fewer choices with the government controlling our everyday 
lives.107  
When pressed for clarification by the press, Sensenbrenner’s office 
explained that “people can choose whether or not they want to use certain 
websites. For instance, in using Facebook, people have the option to agree 
(or not agree) with its terms of agreement, which covers what kind of 
information the social media site collects from its users.”108 
There are of course obvious problems with this logic—the very logic that 
has been used by industry and regulators to avoid meaningful privacy 
regulation in the United States for decades. First, to “choose” not to use the 
Internet is in a very real sense to “choose” not to participate in modern 
society or the modern economy. This might not quite be “sign or die,” but 
it’s close to “sign or not live like most people.” Second, when it comes to 
Internet Service Providers, consumers often face no practical choice 
between providers. ISPs like Comcast or Verizon often operate in virtual or 
actual monopolies for broadband services. To “choose” not to use one’s 
monopolist cable company for wired broadband is functionally to “choose” 
once again not to use the Internet at home. (Good luck streaming Netflix on 
your phone data plan.) Third, even with respect to individual services at the 
platform layer, there is once again a paucity of choice. If you want to use 
social networking to connect to your friends or family, Facebook is often 
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the only real choice. And even if your friends are on Instagram, Facebook 
(and its data practices) own that too.  
Our point is that most consumers in the digital environment have highly 
limited options for consent, much less for bargaining. This is particularly 
the case where monopoly power or something like it applies. Even where 
there is some choice among services (Lyft versus Uber, for example), those 
services may offer functionally identical data terms. Finally, even where 
there is “choice” among alternatives, this is by no means the end of the ways 
in which firms can structure, influence, and nudge consumer choice in ways 
they desire. The coercion continuum is a function not only of the market 
power of companies, but also of those companies’ power over the design of 
interfaces to shape and to influence consumer decision-making. This results 
in “dark patterns,” a term coined by user experience designer Harry 
Brignull. According to Brignull, dark patterns are “tricks used in websites 
and apps that make you buy or sign up for things that you didn't mean to.”109 
Security researcher Greg Conti calls these patterns “malicious” or “evil 
interfaces.”110 Conti and Edward Sobiesk define malicious interfaces simply 
as those that “deliberately violate usable design best practices in order to 
manipulate, exploit, or attack the user.”111 And they are everywhere.  
Common examples of malicious interfaces include “disabled back 
buttons, browsers with ‘sponsored’ default bookmarks, unexpected and 
unnecessary forms, blinking advertisements, and pop-ups covering desired 
content.”112 These malicious interfaces often coerce users into disclosing 
private information.113 Conti and Sobiesk identified eleven kinds of 
malicious interfaces:  
Coercion – Threatening or mandating the user’s compliance. 
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Confusion – Asking the user questions or providing information that 
they do not understand. 
Distraction – Attracting the user’s attention away from their current 
task by exploiting perception, particularly pre-attentive processing. 
Exploiting Errors – Taking advantage of user errors to facilitate the 
interface designer’s goals. 
Forced Work – Deliberately increasing work for the user. 
Interruption – Interrupting the user’s task flow. 
Manipulating Navigation – Creating information architectures and 
navigation mechanisms that guide the user toward interface designer 
task accomplishment. 
Obfuscation – Hiding desired information and interface elements. 
Restricting Functionality – Limiting or omitting controls that would 
facilitate user task accomplishment. 
Shock – Presenting disturbing content to the user. 
Trick – Misleading the user or other attempts at deception.114 
Because companies have strong incentives to obtain consent, it is no 
surprise many of these malicious interfaces are used to coerce, wheedle, and 
manipulate people to grant it. Examples ranging in severity abound. Some 
terms of use agreements just won’t let you say no. They only let you put off 
saying yes until “later.” Other kinds of mediated consent leverage 
psychological pressure to manufacture consent. Consider the concept of 
what Brignull calls “confirmshaming,” that is, “the act of guilting the user 
into opting into something. The option to decline is worded in such a way 
as to shame the user into compliance.”115 Consider the request from 
MyMedic to send users notifications, which forces those who do not wish 
to receive notification to click a button labeled “no, I prefer to bleed to 
death.”116 It’s a subtle form of psychological coercion, but at scale these 
attempts can deplete our resolve.  
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     Other examples abound. “Roach motels” make it easy to enroll or give 
consent, but difficult to leave.117 “Forced continuity” quietly extends your 
consent past initial authorizations with affirmative opt-out obligations.118 
While Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge offered an optimistic 
account of how to use the insights of behavioral economics to influence 
“choice architecture” for social good through what they called “benevolent 
paternalism,” many tech companies today seem to be using it as a cookbook 
for coercive and manipulative decision structures.119  
C. Incapacitated Consent 
The third pathology of consent is incapacitated consent. Like coerced 
consent, incapacitated consent takes the “voluntary” out of “knowing and 
voluntary,” but in this case it does so as a matter of law rather than as a 
matter of circumstance. Incapacitated consents are those where 
voluntariness is simply not available as a matter of law, such as with 
children and others who are categorically incapable of legally consenting.  
While incapacitated consent may be the easiest of the pathologies to 
understand, here, too, some examples will help to illuminate the problem. 
Laws in the United States and Europe have regulated the ways in which 
companies can collect data about children for some time, though with 
limited effectiveness.120 For example, the one area in which the United 
States has a generally applicable Internet data protection regime is the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), which 
regulates online data collection from children. Yet even though the general 
age of contractual consent in the United States is 18, COPPA only regulates 
collection from children under the age of 13.121 This means that even though 
children from 13–18 are legally incapable of contractual consent, it is 
perfectly legal to treat them as consenting adults for data collection purposes 
under the prevailing “notice and consent” regime.122 
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In practice, moreover, whether legally or illegally, it has been trivially 
easy to circumvent the consent of legally incapacitated minors in ways that 
have led to serious financial and even physical harm. For example, both 
Apple and Facebook have come under fire for making it too easy for 
children to run up large debts in app stores or in-app purchases using their 
parents’ credit cards.123 More recently, the dating apps Tinder and Grindr 
were investigated by the UK government after police investigated more than 
thirty cases of child rape resulting from children avoiding the age checks on 
the application interfaces.124 Companies may protest after such incidents 
that they do not intend minors to use their services (and that they put in place 
measures to forestall this). However, the combination of easy-to-install 
applications and a permissive regulatory regime makes it all but inevitable 
that minors will use apps and engage in online and offline activities, ranging 
from data collection to sex, that they lack the legal capacity to consent to. 
Simply put, a notice and choice regime coupled with the general goal of 
“putting users in control” cannot solve the problem of incapacitated consent.  
While the Mark Zuckerbergs of the world might lionize control and 
consent, the digital consumers of the world face a very different reality than 
the idealized one presented by the CEOs and marketing departments of 
technology companies. The idealized model paints a picture of consent that 
evokes the knowing and voluntary gold standard, and relies upon the gold 
standard’s power for its legitimacy. In practice, however, the version of 
consent that most consumers face is a significant and pathological departure 
from the gold standard. Unwitting consent takes the “knowing” out of 
“knowing and voluntary;” coerced and incapacitated consent take the 
“voluntary” out of “knowing and voluntary.” Our articulation of this 
vocabulary for pathologies of consent is intended to provide a useful way to 
identify and critique the ways in which consents in practice fall short of the 
gold standard in theory. Once we can identify the problems, we will be 
better placed to prescribe solutions, and it is to this that we now turn. 
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III. IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CONSENT 
Although the notion of informed consent in digital environments is 
deeply problematic, it could still play an important role under the right 
circumstances. The key is to understand the conditions under which consent 
can meaningfully enhance autonomy and self-determination. Of course, as 
discussed above, the foundational notion of informed consent to data 
practices is that it must be “freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous.” This includes notions of voluntariness and revocability.  
However, we contend that the problem with consent for data practices 
isn’t necessarily in the form or substance of the consent itself. Many 
scholars have examined how to substantively improve requests for informed 
consent.125 But an additional, sometimes fatal, problem lies with the 
circumstances in which consent is given. Informed consent is only useful in 
particular contexts. If the circumstances and structure under which consent 
is asked and given are wrong, that consent will be ineffective even if it is 
“freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.” In this Part, we 
propose three circumstances necessary for an ideal environment for 
effective consent. To be meaningful, requests for consent must be 
infrequent, the risks of giving consent must be vivid and easy to envision, 
and data subjects must have an incentive to take each request seriously. 
Sadly, these conditions are scarce in modern data exchanges, but we believe 
that identifying the problems consumers face in these transactions allows us 
to identify the contexts in which consent can do valuable and legitimate 
work. 
A. Infrequent Requests 
One key to understanding why the pathologies of consent to data 
practices are so problematic in the digital environment is the fact that there 
are no limits on the number of requests for consent. Every day, every digital 
consumer is implicitly or explicitly asked to consent to data collection and 
processing practices for many, if not most, of the websites they visit, the 
online accounts they create, the services they sign up for, and the apps they 
use. Consider your web browsing on laptop and phone, GPS navigation, 
search engines, smartphone operating systems, social networks, taxi 
services, travel booking, video and audio streaming services, and all of the 
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other “free” or paid services you use which serve you ads or otherwise 
collect your data. The result is a casual familiarity turned ennui that leads 
us to gloss over the terms because we know that another request is just 
around the corner. Because each consent request is a drain on our time and 
cognitive load, we wisely choose to conserve our efforts. As one of us has 
written elsewhere,  
Anyone that has turned off notifications for apps like Facebook’s 
Messenger can attest to the relentless, grinding requests for the user 
to turn them back on almost every time the app is opened. Many can 
relate to the experience of a child asking for candy, over and over, 
until the requests become too much to ignore and we give in, simply 
to quiet them. Willpower can feel like a finite, vulnerable, and 
subjective resource, and systems are designed to deplete and erode it. 
Once our willpower and ability to make choices has been 
compromised, the control users have been given is meaningless.126 
Compare this depressing state of affairs to environments with informed 
consent, such as medical treatment, clinical trials, surgeries, and scientific 
research. Request for consent to these practices do not come often, by sheer 
virtue of the fact that treatment and trials are relatively uncommon. 
Thankfully, surgery is not a daily routine. This provides a necessary 
downtime and the space to both take consent requests seriously and go about 
living the rest of our lives. People have the ability to consider informed 
consent to surgery carefully because they know that they will not be asked 
for consent to another surgery in a few minutes. Critically, if they decline 
to give consent to a surgery, people know that they won’t be pestered again 
and again until they say yes. Necessary medical intervention is something 
of a flashpoint in time: people either agree or don’t agree to treatment and 
then get on with it. Practically speaking, the very need to ask for consent to 
surgery just doesn’t present itself very often.  
There is no such practical constraint for consent requests for data 
collection and processing. Data collection and sharing in the modern world 
is frequent, and is becoming as routine as walking, eating, and breathing. 
Data subjects are ceaselessly bombarded with requests for consent. There 
are no limits on the number of times a company is allowed to ask for a 
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person’s consent, and there are no limits on the number of companies that 
may simultaneously ask for it. Even if we could consider each individual 
request rationally, our cognitive bandwidth is overwhelmed. 
If consent is to be effective, it must happen infrequently. This means hard 
choices regarding which requests are more important than others and which 
kinds of companies should be prioritized. This might feel inherently 
paternalistic. Who are lawmakers to demote the importance of particular 
requests? But when all consent requests are important, none of them are. 
Failing to limit who can ask for informed consent, when they can ask, and 
how many times ignores the reality that people need time and space if their 
choices are to be meaningful. When choices are too frequent, consent loses 
its moral legitimacy as a justification for action. 
B. Vivid Risks 
At the JFK Medical Center, the consent form for open heart surgery 
explicitly states that the risks for the procedure include “bleeding requiring 
blood transfusion or return to surgery for repair, nerve damage, heart, liver, 
kidney or lung complication and/or even in rare cases death.”127 That’s 
serious stuff. But the list goes on, including “complications arising in the 
post-operative period preventing normal recuperation. . . . [including] long 
term ventilation, confusion, fluid accumulation of the lungs, pneumonia, 
cardiac arrhythmias, fever and abnormal laboratory results. Also infection, 
long term healing and/or scarring of the surgical site incisions may occur 
and may require further treatment including surgical repair.”128  
Scars, bleeding, fluid accumulation, and death. These are vivid—and 
thus easy—risks for us to envision. So is the risk of consenting to things like 
government searches, which might result in imprisonment. These risks 
might even be too vivid, as once we’ve thought of them they can be difficult 
to push out of our heads.129 We even consent to accept the risk of harm in 
everyday goods and services like rental car agreements that hold the driver 
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responsible for losses or dry cleaners who limit liability for damage to 
clothes to things like replacing or repairing. But personal data is different 
from bodily integrity or damage to our liberty or property. The risks of data 
practices are so opaque that there’s an ongoing debate as to whether they 
should even be legally recognized.130 Certain kinds of surveillance and data 
practices might be “creepy,” but that’s the word we use when we have 
difficulty specifying exactly the risks we are facing.131 In fact, most of the 
risks we face from modern data practices arrive not with a bang but a 
whimper, if we hear them at all. Information is accumulated bit by bit, with 
risk accruing incrementally. This makes envisioning the plethora of harms 
difficult because there is rarely a single moment in time that people can 
point to when the envisioned risk materializes. Unlike severed arteries and 
being put in prison, how can people envision “databases of ruin” that have 
reached the critical mass of jeopardy?132 Informed consent regimes for data 
will only work if the risks are vivid. 
Even worse, these risks that we are being asked to waive through consent 
might materialize without our even knowing it. People typically know when 
they have a heart attack or suffer complications from surgery or 
pharmaceuticals. But our data could be being used against us this very 
moment, and we wouldn’t know it. Hackers could, right now, be opening 
credit cards in your name as a result of that data breach last year that you 
didn’t know you were involved in either. That lack of feedback further 
frustrates our ability to adequately envision the risks. Even when 
manifested, data harms often stay hidden. And our risk calculus is further 
funneled into wild speculation, paranoia, or overconfidence.  
Of course, some data-related harms are easy to envision, such as being 
humiliated because a deeply-held secret is revealed, having your identity 
stolen, or being fired or denied insurance coverage on the basis of a personal 
data dossier or big data prediction. But the problem is that these harms are 
difficult to predict and difficult to trace from particular disclosures of 
information. This leads us to our final pre-condition for gold standard 
consent.  
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C. Incentives to Take Each Request Seriously 
Certain decisions demand to be taken seriously. The reason people 
hesitate before consenting to skydiving and surgery is that if it goes wrong, 
they could die. Mental and physical safety are powerful motivators to 
understand the risks of particular decisions. Imprisonment and exoneration 
are powerful motivators to weigh when granting consent to government 
searches. Even some frequent decisions to grant consent demand to be taken 
seriously, like participating in sports involving physical contact. It’s not just 
that the choices are infrequent and the risks are vivid. It’s that for gold 
standard consent there must be a clear incentive to critically analyze and 
deliberate the request for consent because of the magnitude of the stakes 
involved and the close relationship between the consent and those stakes.  
Requests for informed consent are, by definition, individualized and 
atomized. The moral weight of these frameworks is concentrated in the 
information delivered to the subject and the subject’s voluntary execution 
of a legally significant choice. Through this call and response, people’s 
autonomy is ostensibly respected, which can justify a host of actions that 
would otherwise be objectionable. But these justifications break down when 
people have little incentive to meaningfully consider what is being asked of 
them. This incentive can be diminished either because the stakes appear 
insignificant or because people cannot easily see how their decision is 
consequential because the relationship between the consent and the risks is 
too remote. Others simply have little incentive to take each request seriously 
because they feel powerless.133 
Consider the common fatalistic sentiment that privacy is already dead.134 
Ian Bogost argues that it’s hopeless to try and opt out of surveillance 
capitalism, proclaiming that “the age of privacy nihilism is here.”135 Bogost 
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paints a bleak picture, in which “[e]verything you have done has been 
recorded, munged, and spat back at you to benefit sellers, advertisers, and 
the brokers who service them. It has been for a long time, and it’s not going 
to stop.”136 
It’s hard to blame anyone who feels this way, even if there’s so much 
privacy left to fight for.137 Tech companies are now the backbone of the 
American economy. They are multi-billion dollar companies that have their 
fingers in nearly every aspect of our lives. Even if people were merely 
skeptical of the tech giants with the most personal data, sometimes called 
the “Big Five” (Amazon, Google, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft), people 
would likely find it difficult, if not impossible, to live a normal, modern life 
without interacting with them.138 For the ninety-one percent of Americans 
that feel that they have lost control over their data, why should any single 
request for consent compel any forethought at all?139 Under this view, our 
consent is a fait accompli—something to quickly agree to without 
deliberation, because there is little point in resistance.  
Another way consent can break down is it can be very difficult to draw 
a line from the practices that need consent to the stakes of the decision. Data 
harms, unlike physical harms, are not localized. They occur offstage and far 
away, on servers in remote countries and in boardrooms in faraway cities. 
The Internet is littered with infographics attempting to chart the flow of data 
from users to platforms to third party vendors and onward downstream.140 
The expanse of it all is mind boggling. In this light, data subjects have little 
reason to avoid clicking “I agree” because the services they are using are 
local, such as the Facebook or Uber app, and the risks are remote, such as 
unobserved data flows on the other side of the world. Again, people would 
have little incentive to deliberate because, frankly, they have little notion of 
the stakes, and the benefits of consent are right at their fingertips. 
Finally, consent justifications are weakened when each particular request 
is just one tiny piece of the larger risk puzzle. Our consent to data practices 
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is astonishingly dispersed. Thousands of apps and services ask us for small, 
incremental disclosures, few of which involve the kind of information 
collection that might give people pause. While dating apps and platforms 
that collect sensitive and large amounts of personal data might cause some 
people to consider their risks, it’s not as though people share all their 
information at once. Instead, it trickles out over time, such that our 
incentives to deliberate at the point of agreement are small because we don’t 
know how much information we will ultimately end up sharing. Most of the 
time, it probably seems like a small amount. This is like the problem of 
death by a thousand cuts. And there’s little guidance for people regarding 
which individual cuts matter. So people make the transaction-rational 
decision to chalk up each individual request for consent as “no big deal” in 
perpetuity. Such an environment is no place to condition our well-being.  
Finally, people don’t have great incentives to weigh the externalities of 
consent. That is, typically people only consider how a particular consented-
to action will affect themselves. By allowing consent to companies to collect 
and process my data, those companies can then better target ads to everyone 
else who uses the service. One person’s data becomes a point of comparison 
that allows for refined targeting, processing, and use elsewhere in the 
system. People probably don’t take into account this externality when 
deciding whether to agree or not to give consent for data processing. There 
just aren’t enough incentives for people to consider the implications of data 
processing for other people on a consistent basis, which creates a collective 
action problem, another pathology of consent to data practices to add to the 
list. 
IV. BEYOND CONSENT 
America desperately needs a new direction for its privacy rules. Notions 
of consent, control, and transparency have dominated data protection 
discussions for years, and the result is a sea of “I agree” buttons, drop-down 
menus, and switches that we are unable to navigate.141  
In terms of meaningfully protecting our privacy, this approach has been 
a spectacular failure. The shortcomings of consent and transparency are 
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particularly visible in the United States. Congress is still trying to settle on 
its approach to privacy, but most of the current proposals still build off the 
notice and choice model.142 The FTC has made a heroic effort to be the top 
U.S. privacy cop, but it has been starved of the legal tools and financial 
resources it needs to do a proper job.  
America has a bad reputation for privacy.143 The world is watching and 
judging, and the economic stakes are enormous. International data flows are 
essential for the global economy to function without fundamentally—and 
expensively—restructuring the Internet to America’s huge financial 
detriment. American tech companies depend on being able to smoothly 
import European data for processing. But, in 2015, a European Court ruled 
that America’s privacy protections were so poor that it struck down the 
“Safe Harbor” agreement, which helped enable an international flow of 
data.144 Our current data sharing agreement with Europe, called the EU/U.S. 
“Privacy Shield,” is in jeopardy.145 If it fails, we will need a good 
replacement.  
Europe and others have encouraged the U.S. to adopt a law similar to the 
EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation. But a “U.S. GDPR” seems 
destined to suffer from the same consent pathologies we have explored in 
this article. As discussed above, the GDPR and forthcoming ePrivacy 
directive borrow too heavily from the control and transparency playbook.  
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Our current approach too often results in nothing more than cluttered 
minds and inboxes, with people resigned to take-it-or-leave it choices for 
ad-supported web or social media. Relying upon consent to justify data 
practices rests on the dubious assumptions that people understand what they 
are being told, and we can meaningfully calculate the risk of our choices 
online and exercise agency through mediated technologies. 
It should be no wonder that under this framework, privacy—our human 
information policy—has begun to fall apart, often in breathtaking ways. 
We’ve seen a cascade of high-profile privacy failures like the Edward 
Snowden disclosures, the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the targeting of 
fake news based on data about political preferences, and data breach after 
data breach after data breach. Backing this up is an entire ecosystem 
dependent upon an illusion of control and wheedling, cajoling, and 
extracting consent by any method possible.  
In spite of the failures of control and transparency, some lawmakers are 
considering doubling down on this failed strategy. But no matter how much 
control we are given, it will never work online. As we’ve tried to show in 
this essay, consent regimes burden data subjects with all of the risks of 
understanding and self-protection while keeping the data machine 
humming. Consent does not scale without losing its legitimacy.146 The 
control that consent regimes promise us ends up being illusory and 
overwhelming. Even when companies are transparent, it doesn’t lead to 
reform. Big tech platforms and shadowy advertising companies make their 
fortunes while the rest of us are watched, nudged, exploited, and exposed to 
data breaches and the manipulation of politics and elections. 
There is a better way.  
We should have rules that are more sensitive to relationships and power 
disparities. One way to do this is for lawmakers to create rules designed to 
protect our trust—trust in the Internet, trust in those entities that hold our 
data and promise to use it for our benefit, trust in our economy and in our 
digital society.147 Being trustworthy in the digital age means being discreet 
with our data, honest about the risk of data practices, protective of our 
personal information, and, above all, loyal to us, the data subjects.148 
There are some indications that lawmakers are willing to consider a trust-
based approach to modern privacy rules. In late 2018, U.S. Senator Brian 
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Schatz introduced the “Data Care Act of 2018.”149 Among other things, the 
bill goes beyond control and transparency goals in favor of three key non-
waivable trust-based obligations for companies that use the Internet to 
collect personal information about people: duties of care, loyalty, and 
confidentiality. These duties are modeled after what is required of those in 
a fiduciary relationship, such as a trustee designed to care for a trust on 
behalf of a beneficiary, but they would apply more broadly if this bill were 
to pass.150 They would require tech companies of all kinds to act more like 
doctors than telemarketers. 
Trust rules would eschew consent regimes in favor of obligations to be 
protective and discrete and refrain from manipulative practices. They would 
aim to keep tech companies from elevating their short-term profits over our 
long-term interests. And ideally, legislative efforts built around trust would 
give regulators the resources they need and prohibit companies from using 
dense terms of use agreements to get us to waive those obligations. An 
explicit rejection of flimsy “consent” regimes is an important step forward 
for American privacy regimes.151 Companies should be obligated to be 
trustworthy regardless of what we clicked to “agree” to online. 
Another way lawmakers could address some of the pathologies of 
consent is by targeting abusive trade practices. Sunstein and Thaler’s Nudge 
is not a cookbook for manipulators, but it has been used as such, and the law 
should step in to negate these practices. One of us has argued elsewhere that 
rules against abusive trade practices and abusive design of information 
technologies can help mitigate some of the inherent vulnerabilities of 
control regimes.152  
The notion of abusive design can be found in consumer protection law, 
which aims to protect consumer choice. The most prominent prohibition on 
abusive practices in the United States comes from the relatively new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act authorized the CFPB to 
prohibit any “abusive” act or practice that: 
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand 
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or 
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(2) takes unreasonable advantage of— 
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; 
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or 
service; or 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered 
person to act in the interests of the consumer.153  
Rules against abusive trade practices look to the problems people have in 
assessing risks and benefits even with accurate, truthful information. They 
should begin with an internal inquiry into how we process information.154 
Since the pathologies of consent are all related to our limitations in 
processing information, this seems as good of a place as any for privacy 
reform to begin with.  
It’s time to take a bold step forward. America has an opportunity to 
redefine itself as the country that protects the trust that people give to 
companies. By embracing trust, America can become a leader on privacy 
instead of following the path of false promises, diminishing returns, and the 
tedium and vicious banality of mindless clicks of “I agree” buttons. Call it 
legal innovation, if that’s what it takes. But whatever we call it, by requiring 
that companies respect our trust, America can pave the way for a safe, 
sustainable, and profitable digital future. 
CONCLUSION 
Tools are only fit for certain purposes. Legal tools are no different from 
physical tools in this respect. Frederick Schauer once likened legal tools to 
the problem of driving a nail into a board when you have a pipe wrench but 
no hammer. Pipe wrenches are great for tightening or loosening pipes, but 
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they make lousy hammers. You could certainly try to drive the nail into the 
board with a pipe wrench, but you probably wouldn’t get it in straight, if 
you get it in at all. And you’d probably damage the pipe wrench.155 Schauer 
was talking about the First Amendment, but consent is a bit like a pipe 
wrench as well—it is incredibly useful, even necessary, where it’s the right 
tool for the job, but it can be easily overused, to the detriment of both the 
task and the tool. 
We have over-used the tool of consent to the point that it has become 
badly damaged. Consent does and should play an essential role in our law, 
but it cannot do everything well all the time. The over-use of consent in the 
digital context, combined with limited legal policing of the sufficiency of 
consent has allowed great fortunes to be created on the basis of personal 
data, but it has also exposed consumers to data breaches, identity theft, and 
a surveillance economy unprecedented in human history, one which 
stretches the very notion of “consent” to say that it was ever actually agreed 
to. More fundamentally, the manufacturing of consent by exploiting 
consent’s pathologies has diminished the trust in our digital environment 
that is the key ingredient toward a better future. We can do better, but in 
order to do so, we need to recognize the pathologies of consent, and limit 
consent to the contexts in which it is most justified. Going forward, we must 
rely on strategies other than fictive, manufactured, or coerced consent to 
minimize the risks and harms of our information economy, if we seek to 
take advantage of its benefits in a sustainable, ethical, and progressive way. 
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